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P R E F A C E 
The Euratom Commission has decided to publish the report on "The problem of 
uranium resources and the long-term supply position" which it has received from the 
Consultative Committee of the Supply Agency. This report tries to give an objective 
estimate of the conditions which up to 1980 will determine the trend of the uranium 
market in the free world and the position of the Community as regards uranium supplies. 
While recognizing that such estimates must be speculative, the Commission is 
particularly interested in three ideas which emerge very clearly from the various sur-
veys that have been made. 
1. A comparison of requirements and resources shows that the free world will not 
run short of uranium for nuclear electric power during the period under review. 
2. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that uranium resources are available at the 
right time and the right price, it would be advisable to take appropriate measures in 
the near future, and in particular to start prospecting for uranium. Furthermore, the 
Commission shares the view of the Consultative Committee that for this purpose a special 
effort should be made to discover the methods best suited to the new uranium-prospecting 
conditions. 
Under these conditions, it seems reasonably certain that reserves of uranium 
workable at less than $10 per lb. U3OS (454 gr. of UeOg) will be amply sufficient to supply 
the requirements of the free world. 
3. The Commission was extremely pleased to note the importance which the Con-
sultative Committee attaches to developing the string of breeder reactors, since this type 
of reactor, when perfected, will enable uranium resources to be considerably increased. 
With the breeder string, not only is the fissile part of natural uranium able to be used 
as before, but also the fertile part can be converted into plutonium, which is likewise 
fissile; thus the string will extract the maximum energy that it is technically possible to 
obtain from the uranium, and thereby considerably reduce the proportion accounted for 
by the price of uranium in the cost of nuclear power. In consequence, it will be possible 
to tap substantial uranium-bearing deposits which are already known but are at present 
unfit to be worked on economically acceptable terms owing to their low uranium con-
tent. 
The Commission subscribes to the view that the advent of the breeder string will 
not ease the demand for uranium immediately. In the first place, it will be some years 
before the effects of breeding become reflected in the quantities available for constantly 
growing requirements. Secondly, the rate at which this phase of nuclear power output 
starts up will be closely dependent on the amounts of plutonium available and, conse-
quently, on the progress of primary reactors, which will have to be constructed and 
operated for several decades to come. 

THE PROBLEM OF URANIUM RESOURCES 
AND THE LONG-TERM SUPPLY POSITION 
SUMMARY 
The report describes the situation of the natural uranium industry in the free world and its 
future development as far as 1980. It takes stock of currently listed reserves workable at a price of $8-10 
per lb. UÏOS and assesses their quantitative trend up to 1970, allowing for production programmes up to 
that date. Foreseeable consumption of natural uranium between 1970 and 1980 is estimated and com-
pared with the reserves still available. The development of the uranium market is considered more 
particularly as it affects the Community. 
This report also gives estimates of nuclear power output, and an annex shows the method used 
to calculate the corresponding uranium requirements. 
Introduction 
It is a fact that the world's uranium industry is at present over-producing and 
that prices have slumped and will remain very low during the years immediately ahead. 
Hitherto, however, uranium has been used primarily for military purposes, where-
as there can be little doubt that towards the end of the current decade the production 
of nuclear electricity will expand all over the world. 
Since any raw-material supply policy must be drawn up on a long-term basis, the 
question arises whether the present slack state of the uranium market can continue for 
long in view of the increased demand resulting from atomic energy production after 
1970, and consequently whether the European Community should not make certain plans 
now with a view to ensuring long-term supplies of uranium on the best possible conditions. 
The object of this report is to state the position as regards these problems. 
Let us begin with a review of the currently listed reserves which are known with 
a fair degree of certainty: these are the quantities of ore or metal which are now 
available, or could if necessary be made available, for production programmes. 
But it is quite certain that this purely "static" view cannot be used as anything 
more than a starting point and that it is necessary to examine the development of these 
reserves, taking into account not only the estimated or foreseeable production for the 
coming years but also the effects which changes in the production structures—insofar 
as they can be predicted at the moment—are bound to have on the remaining reserves. 
A valid examination of these few aspects of the problem is, however, only possible 
for the period up to 1970; and if as a result we are already able to form some con-
clusions at this stage, we shall still have to study the crux of the problem, i.e. on the 
one hand the supply prospects after 1970 as a function of the remaining reserves, and 
on the other hand the possibility of increasing these reserves by exploring for new 
uranium deposits or, should this prove feasible, by taking into production the reserves 
which are at present not considered commercially exploitable. 
Finally, we shall set off these possibilities against the probable uranium demand, 
bearing in mind, of course, that there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the 
estimated consumption after 1966 because it still is not known exactly what part nuclear 
energy will play in the electric power programmes of each country, and also because 
it is even more difficult to foresee the development of the military programmes. 
I. PRESENT RESERVES OF THE FREE WORLD 
It is noteworthy that uranium, the initial history of which after 1940 was shrouded 
in strict secrecy, has in the last few years become the metal which is most freely dis-
cussed as far as the known reserves and even the price are concerned, except, of course, 
in the Eastern bloc. Most of the countries possessing uranium deposits have published 
official figures on reserves and have sometimes released details enabling the value of 
the assessments to be ascertained. This is a fortunate state of affairs since it enables the 
total volume of available reserves to be estimated fairly accurately, thus facilitating the 
choice of measures which may be adopted to ensure future supplies. 
On numerous occasions studies have been made of the world's available reserves, 
either by the specialized authorities of the various countries or at international con-
ferences. One of the most recent efforts in this direction on an international plane was 
the conference held in Buenos Aires at the end of 1960. Since then, more detailed 
information has been issued or previous data revised. 
Appended to the present report is a table which, though certainly still incomplete, 
summarizes the latest information gathered either from special publications and reports or 
from unpublished documents received by the Euratom Supply Agency. 
It should be noted that this table only gives those reserves the exploitation of 
which, is or would be compatible with a sales price of up to $ 8-10/lb for the Us0 8 
oxide present in chemical concentrates. Although the possibility of determining the 
total reserves without considering prices is perfectly conceivable, since the latter depend 
on variable economic factors, we believe that, up to a certain point at least, it is neces-
sary to take account of the reference price which is most generally accepted in the 
present circumstances. Indeed, nothing could be more misleading than to set up a table 
showing tonnages corresponding to any natural concentrations of uranium without taking 
account of the cost of extracting it from the ore and subsequently processing it in 
industrial plants, or of the efficiency of the various operations involved. On the other 
hand, when we examine all the possible ways of meeting future requirements, we must 
not overlook the fact that resources which are too costly to exploit today. may become 
attractive at some later date. We shall therefore revert to this matter later in this 
report. 
Furthermore, it was our intention to include in the appended table only those 
reserves which have been proven or assessed with a virtually uniform measure of cer-
tainty. The term "reserved" here covers all quantities of ore, the tonnage and content 
characteristics and the deposit conditions of which have been determined either by 
surface reconnaissance or by test borings, depending on the type of deposit. Evaluations 
based on unverified extrapolations are therefore excluded. 
Tbk table shows that among the producing countries there are essentially three 
which, in view of the extent of their reserves, are likely to play a dominant long-term 
role in the supply of uranium. Consequently, it is to these three countries, namely 
Canada, South Africa and the United States, to which special reference must be made. 
The table below gives the principal figures as at 1.1.1962: 
URANIUM RESERVES AS AT 1.1.1962 (1) 
U.S.A. 
CANADA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Other countries 
FREE-WORLD TOTAL 
Ore 
in millions of tons 
64 
145 
680 
Average 
content 
0.2 % 
0.1 '% 
0.017% 
Uranium metal 
in metric tons 
130,000 
145,000 (*) 
115,000 (**) 
60,000 
450,00O> 
(*) Other estimates take into account a further 60,000 tons which are also apparently recoverable. 
(**) Estimate by the Chamber of Mines of the Union of South Africa; in respect of reserves recoverable 
at a price of $8 per lb. of U3Os. 
It must be emphasized that in the United States the USAEC has revised its pre-
vious estimates during the past year; the figures quoted above should be compared 
with those issued by the AEC in 1961: 74 million metric tons of ore, containing 
175,000 metric tons of metal. 
Canada has carried out a similar re-assessment, which we consider to be reflected 
in the figures quoted. 
As regards South Africa, the above-quoted figures probably correspond to the total 
available potential in the gold-bearing formations of the Rand basin, although by far 
the greater part of these resources are indicated reserves based solely on test borings. 
This extrapolation is only possible because of the unusual geological uniformity of these 
formations. It will be noted that the average content in the ores is comparatively low, 
but it should be borne in mind that since the gold itself generally imparts an additional 
value of these ores, a lower uranium content is sufficient to justify extraction at a price 
of $8-10. 
Although this is not always expressly stated in our sources of information, we 
believe that the figures given in Table 1 of the Appendix represent the recoverable 
quantity of ore and metal in the formations, account being taken of the efficiency of 
present-day techniques for the extraction and processing of ores. 
(1) All figures in this report express tonnages of uranium metal contained in the ores. As is 
known, the unit commonly used by the Anglo-Saxons is the short ton of U s0 8 content, which represents 
approximately 0.76 metric tons of uranium metal. 
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Π. DEVELOPMENT OF RESERVES IN THE 1962-1970 PERIOD 
An attempt can be made to forecast the trend which may be followed during the 
next few years by the reserves we have just been discussing. To confine ourselves to the 
present decade—for beyond that the situation cannot be foreseen with anything like the 
same degree of certainty—this development will be due primarily to the actual exploi­
tation of the mines now open, to changes in the production structures and, finally, to 
new discoveries, if any. 
Canadian, United States and South African production will probably be determined 
by the contracts currently in force, up to 1966 as far as the United States is concerned 
and up to 1970 in the case of Canada and South Africa. 
The table below shows the quantities of uranium metal (in metric tons) covered 
by the current contracts or forecasts of which we have been informed. Although these 
figures are no doubt open to question, they can safely be accepted in view of the fact 
that the civilian demand in the various countries is now, and will continue to be, 
determined by the reactor construction programmes. There may, however, be some 
additional requirements for military purposes. 
FORECAST URANIUM EXTRACTION FOR THE 1962-1970 PERIOD 
(in metric tons) 
U.S.A 
CANADA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Other countries 
FREE-WORLD TOTAL 
Forecast for 
1962-1966 
47,000 (*) 
22,000 
13,000 
9,000 
91,200 
Forecast for 
1967-1971 
24,000 (*) 
2,800 (**) 
5,000 
7,000 
38,000 
TOTAL 
1962-1971 
71,000 (*) 
25,000 
18,000 (***) 
16,000 
130,000 
(*) Taking into account the spreading policy recently decided upon by the USAEC. 
(**) Up to and including 1969. 
(***) Up to and including 1972. 
Although the estimated rate of production shows a very marked decline in com­
parison with the levels attained in the years 1959-1961 (an average of 22,000 t /a for 1962-66 
as against 30,000 t in 1960), it can nevertheless be stated that considerable inroads will 
have been made into the present known reserves by the beginning of the next decade. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF RESERVES IN THE 1962-1970 PERIOD 
(in metric tons) 
U.S.A. 
CANADA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Other countries 
FREE-WORLD TOTAL 
Reserves as at 1.1.61 
130,000 
145,000 
115,000 
60,000 
450,000 
Extraction in the 
period 1962-1970 
71,000 
25.COO 
18,000 
16,000 
130,000 
Reserves as at 1.1.71 
59,000 
120,000 
97,000 
44,000 
320,000 
The United States would therefore be left with metal reserves of only about 
59,000 tons, which is very little for a country which is bound to make extensive use of 
nuclear power; Canada and South Africa, with respectively 120,000 and 97,000 tons of 
metal in reserve, will be the only countries in a position to supply uranium if there is 
no change in the present reserve situation. Now, there is known to be little likelihood 
of South Africa's being able to increase its uranium production appreciably above 
5,000 t/a, since that production is closely bound up with the output of gold. 
In the United States, the USAEC recently decided on a policy of spreading out 
current contracts until 1968 and supplementary purchases over 1969-1971 of quantities 
equal to those carried over, or a maximum of 12,000 tons. This radically alters sales 
prospects for producers, since the AEC's intention until quite recently was virtually to 
suspend all'purchasing after 1966 for an indefinite period. 
This decision removes the uncertainty that was hovering over the post-1966 period 
and gives the producers the opportunity to sell definite though limited quantities, at 
known prices, up to the beginning of the next decade; in the normal way, it should 
therefore relieve them of the necessity to close certain mines, which would have led to 
the flooding of underground mines and the loss of considerable reserves, and at the same 
time would have encouraged producers to develop the richest ores and abandon those 
with marginal contents. 
In Canada, despite the slight respite resulting from the recent British contract, the 
production capacity as from 1965 will be reduced to that of a single plant, i.e. about 
800 t/a of metal (as against 12,000 t in 1959), and as far as can be foreseen at present 
even this capacity will not be fully loaded. By 1965 the cost of production will no doubt 
be fairly low—around $ 4-5/lb.—since the installations will largely have been written off. 
But the revival of an industry capable of attaining production levels approaching those 
of 1959 will certainly not be possible unless uranium prices increase considerably. At 
least, in the case of Canada, it can be assumed that, owing to the nature of the deposits, 
wasteful exploitation is less likely, and there is some hope that the temporary closing 
of mines will result in a less serious loss of reserves than in the United States. 
Finally, in South Africa the problem is somewhat different. The majority of 
mining infrastructure designed for the production of gold will survive. After the gold has 
been extracted, the uranium-bearing ores can be stored with a view to subsequent extraction 
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of the u ran ium. T h e South African producers will p robably re ta in the i r processing plants , 
bu t even should they no t do so South Africa's posit ion will a pr ior i r emain the least 
impai red bo th from t h e economic s tandpoin t and as regards the conservation of u r an ium 
reserves. 
The re is, of course, a chance t ha t new discoveries will be m a d e to offset this 
ra ther pessimistic prognosis; one can never ru le out the possibility t ha t the existence 
of a r ich deposit will be revealed in t h e near future, a l though there have been no 
discoveries of impor tan t ore-bearing districts since 1956. Nevertheless, i t is to be fore-
seen t ha t the diminishing purchases and falling prices will scarcely encourage pr ivate 
companies in the Uni ted States and Canada to invest in the search for u r a n i u m unless 
special government policy is involved. Bu t the re we are already touching u p o n measures 
which may be p rompted by an examinat ion of the prevai l ing condi t ions; wha t concerns 
us he re is the s i tuat ion as i t will be if no special steps are taken. 
To conclude, t h e quant i t ies of u r a n i u m that , in pr inc ip le would still be available, 
on the basis of UgO s value of $ 8-10 or less per pound, are l imited, and only Canada and 
South Africa will be able to play a pa r t in the supply of u r a n i u m on a world-wide scale. 
Fu r the rmore , the development of p roduct ion pa t te rns due to t h e small demand in the 
next years will result in the loss of a substant ia l pa r t of t h e reserves which would 
theoret ical ly remain available. 
We shall therefore definitely assume tha t the reserves as at 1 J anua ry 1971 cor-
responding to the deposits the existence of which is known today and which can be 
worked at a ra te of 8 or 10 $ will be of the order of 320,000 tons of na tu ra l u ran ium. 
This marked state of depression in t h e u r a n i u m mining indust ry will prevai l at 
the very t ime when all t he evidence points towards an upswing in nuclear power pro-
duction. 
III. POSSIBLE DEMAND FOR URANIUM IN T H E FREE WORLD AFTER 1 9 7 0 
We have jus t been seen t ha t in 1970 the available u r a n i u m reserves of the free 
world, workable at $ 8-10 per lb . UsOg, wil l be about 320,000 tons U, after extract ion 
of some 130,000 tons U dur ing the per iod 1962-1971 and approximate ly 180,000 tons 
before 1962. 
In o ther words, the u r a n i u m discoveries in t h e free world since the war amount 
at present to about 630,000 tons U, of which 320,000 will have been extracted by 1 January 
1971. 
DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION AND RESERVES SINCE 1945 
(in metric tons) 
Production before 1962 
Estimated production 1962-1971 
Reserves remaining on 1.1.1971 
Total reserves discovered to date 
180,000 
130,000 
320,000 
630,000 tons U 
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It will be noted that the volume of production is large in relation to the reserves. 
But before any judgment can be passed as to the possible inadequacy of the 320,000 tons 
of reserves remaining on 1 January 1971, it is necessary to calculate the orders of 
magnitude of the consumption after that date. 
We have chosen 1970-1980 as a reference period, the three principal reasons being 
as follows: 
— Most experts believe that nuclear energy will become competitive around 1970, 
but it would be very presumptuous to attempt to fix the date to within less than a few 
years either way. In our opinion, therefore, it is preferable to consider a period long 
enough to permit the effects of this competitivity, which in any case will come about 
gradually, to even themselves out. 
— There is a substantial measure of discontinuity in the uranium consumption 
per MWe according to whether we base our assumptions on present-day primary reactor 
techniques or on breeder reactors. Up to 1980, at least, it is practically certain that 
primary-type reactors will be employed, since breeder reactors cannot come into use on 
an industrial scale for another fifteen years or so, i.e. towards 1980. Consequently, one 
technique will not be outsted by the other overnight, in view of the fact that primary 
reactors will still be necessary for a good many years to provide the initial charge of 
plutonium for breeder reactors. 
— As far as the mining industry is concerned, any policy for new resources 
initiated in 1963 would scarcely have time to take effect before 1970 (owing to the time-
lag for exploration and investment). Conversely, we consider it neither necessary nor 
realistic to attempt to foresee the situation after 1980. 
A review of demand must embrace all the countries of the free world, since the 
production and consumption of uranium in each country will not necessarily balance 
out. 
The demand for uranium is determined on the-basis of the forecast of nuclear 
capacity to be installed between 1970 and 1980. This forecast is in turn bound up with 
long-term forecasts for the major countries or groups of countries, relating to the demand 
for electricity, the maximum load, the total generating capacity to be installed, and an 
assumption concerning the share to be borne in these programmes by nuclear power 
plants. 
Various bodies have published forecasts of the nuclear generating capacity to be 
expected in 1970, 1975 or 1980. In this report we have taken care to adopt only the 
most conservative of the various figures put forward, and we have again been extremely 
cautious where, for lack of published estimates we have had to extrapolate or propose 
figures. 
Needless to say, however, these figures comprise a wide margin of uncertainty. 
For the sake of simplicity, we have adopted an average figure. In point of fact, there 
is often more than one value for each estimate, depending on the forecast trend of 
general economic activity (1). 
(1) N.B. We could have given short hypotheses and long hypotheses corresponding to the various 
hypotheses for the national income growth, the development of the nuclear industry's share in this in-
crease and the performance of nuclear reactors. But this would soon give rise to complicated diagrams 
in which the composite probability from each combination of the various hypotheses would have to be 
given. We have preferred to confine ourselves to the hypothesis which seemed to us the most probable. 
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As regards the European Community, the Inter-Executive Energy Group has recently 
published a "Study of long-term energy prospects", in which Euratom collaborated on 
the part concerning nuclear energy (Chapter 12). 
According to this study, nuclear generating capacity, which would be about 3,500 
to 4,000 MWe in 1970, would rise to 10-16,000 MWe in 1975. A reasonable extrapolation 
from these figures gives us 30-40,000 MWe in 1980. Thus it seems to be in keeping with 
our desire for caution to adopt a mean growth figure of approximately 30,000 MWe 
for nuclear electricity output between 1970 and 1980; this figure corresponds to about 
25% of all new construction. 
For the United Kingdom the figure adopted is 30%. 
For the United States the figure is 20%, in accordance with the latest published 
forecasts. The same proportion is taken for Canada. In view of the distinctly advanta-
geous position of the United States as regards fossil fuel reserves, this proportion suggests 
that the figure given for Europe is a modest one. 
As for the other countries of the free world, which we have set apart because 
they do not at present have atomic programmes of any importance, it is difficult to make 
a forecast. Some of them may nevertheless be greatly interested in nuclear energy, 
whereas others may lack the industrial basis and specialist personnel which are necessary 
for the rapid development of nuclear energy on a large scale. 
Among the countries capable of launching sizeable atomic programmes we list: 
— Japan 
— Brazil 
— Argentina 
— India 
— South Africa 
Adopting the same cautious approach, we have therefore assumed that only 10% 
of the new generating plants erected in these countries between 1970 and 1980 will be 
nuclear installations. 
The coresponding consumptions of natural uranium will depend to some extent 
on the techniques employed (light-water, enriched-uranium reactor; graphite, natural-
uranium reactor; heavy-water, natural-uranium reactor). However, the calculations show 
that the orders of magnitude do not differ much; only heavy water can permit sub-
stantially lower uranium consumptions per MWe. 
On the assumption that the United States will use enriched uranium, Canada and 
the United Kingdom natural uranium and the other countries, including Europe, 50% 
enriched and 50% natural uranium, we finally arrive at the figures given in the table 
below : 
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NUCLEAR GENERATING CAPACITY TO BE INSTALLED BETWEEN 1970 AND 1980 
(in MWe) 
European Community 
United Kingdom 
Other European Countries 
U.S.A. 
Canada 
Other countries 
of the free world 
Free-world total 
Total electric power 
to be installed 
between 1970 and ¡1980 
120,000 
40,000 
46,000 
190,000 
24,000 
100,000 
520,000 
Proportion 
of nuclear power 
2 5 % 
3 0 % 
1 0 % 
2 0 % 
2 0 % 
1 0 % 
2 0 % 
Nuclear power 
installed 
between 1970 and 1980 
30,000 
12,000 
5,000 
38,000 
5,000 
10,000 
100,000 
The consumptions of na tu ra l u r a n i u m corresponding to the above figures are as 
follows : 
CONSUMPTION OF NATURAL URANIUM FOR THE PERIOD 1970-1980 
(in metric tons) 
Europe 
North America 
Other countries 
Total for free world 
Installed nuclear power 
in (1970, 
in MWe 
10,000 
6,000 
1,000 
17,000 
Installed nuclear power 
in 1980, 
in MWe 
57,000 
49,000 
11,000 
117,000 
Natural uranium 
consumption, 
in tons U 
100,000 
70,000 
20,000 
190,000 
In short , t he demand for na tu ra l u r a n i u m between 1970 and 1980 can be charac-
terized as shown below, on the basis of the current ly employed techniques. 
URANIUM REQUIREMENTS BETWEEN 1970 AND 1980 
(in metric tons) 
Europe 
North America 
Other countries 
Total for free world 
Annual requirements 
in 1970 
4,000 
3,000 
,1,000 
8,000 
Annual requirements 
in 1980 
20,000 
14,000 
4,000 
38,000 
Cumulative 
requirements 
1970-1980 
100,000 
70,000 
20,000 
190,000 
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From this brief out l ine it can be seen t h a t : 
— u r a n i u m requi rements for the ten-year per iod 1970-80 will probably total about 
200,000 tons and possibly m o r e ; say, somewhere in the 180-250,000 tons r ange ; 
— annual consumption will increase from 8-10,000 tons a year in 1970 to 35-50,000 
tons a year in 1980. 
We have assumed t ha t the requi rements of nuclear power plants for the period 
up to 1970 will be me t by purchases and u r a n i u m stocks accumulated by the various Atomic 
Commissions before t ha t date. We are adopt ing t h e same hypothesis for mar ine engines 
over the same period. Possible mi l i ta ry requi rements could be added to these estimates, 
bu t at present no precise figures are available. W e are working on the assumption tha t 
the above-mentioned purchases and stocks will meet this demand u p to 1980. 
T h e u r a n i u m requi rements listed above would doubtless be reduced by recycling 
p lu ton ium or using t ho r ium as a ferti le mate r ia l in conventional reactor types. This 
eventuali ty would, however, only apply to cer ta in reloadings and would only have a 
slight effect on the total requi rements , since the first charges m a k e u p a large percentage 
of these requi rements anyway. 
Final ly, special reference should also b e made to stocks of fissile mater ia ls p repared 
specifically for mi l i tary purposes. Stocks of this k ind may, depending on the poli t ical 
circumstances, seriously upset the nuclear fuel marke t , at least temporar i ly , bu t it is 
impossible to make any k ind of predic t ion in this sphere. 
IV. SUPPLY POSSIBILITIES AFTER 1 9 7 0 
We have jus t seen an est imate of the reserves which will still be available in 1970. 
As regards product ion plants , however, it is known tha t , provided no new contin-
gency arises, the re will be only one p lan t in opera t ion in Canada in 1965, while in 
South Africa there will only be five actually engaged on product ion out of a total of 
22 by 1970. On the by no means certain assumption t ha t all t he US plants will still 
be kep t opera t ing u p to 1970, the following p ic tu re is obta ined of the state of the u r a n i u m 
industry in 1970: 
STATE OF URANIUM INDUSTRY IN 1970 
(in metric tons) 
U.S.A. 
Canada (*) 
South Africa 
Other countries 
Total for free world 
Reserves on 
1 January 1971 
59,000 
120,000 
97,000 
44,000 
320,000 
Capacity of Plants 
still in operation 
6- 9,000 
1,000 
2,000 
1,500 
10-13,500 
(*) If the additional 60,000 tons in Canada should prove to be recoverable [see page 10, foot of page(*)], 
the reserves on 1 January 1971 would, of course, be increased by that amount. 
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From a comparison between the capacity of the plants still in existence in 1970 
and the probable annual requirements at that date (13,500 tons and about 8 to 10,000 tons 
respectively), it is clear that the existing plants will be perfectly capable of meeting the 
demand up to about 1970-72. As the cost of all these installations is now or will by then 
be written off, production prices will be very low, namely, about $3-4 in South Africa, 
$4-5 in Canada and $4-7 in the US. 
Of primary interest here, however, is the development of the market after 1970, 
and by way of an introduction we shall make a few general remarks concerning the 
uranium economy. 
It will be recalled that uranium concentrates are obtained via the following stages: 
— extraction of the mineral 
— pulverisation 
— chemical processing of the pulp 
The cost per ton of mineral is fairly rigidly established for these three operations, 
since it is the same ton which is handled up to nearly the end of the whole process. 
It is thus not difficult to imagine that in the final analysis the cost of the uranium 
extracted will be very largely in inverse proportion to the ore content, the processing 
cost per ton of ore remaining in any case within the following orders of magnitude: 
— extraction of ore in underground mine 
— chemical processing 
— depreciation of plant 
Total: $12-20/t 
If the uranium content in the mineral is about 1 %c, the cost per pound of υ 3 0 8 (1) 
will therefore be between $5.50 and $8. If the content is 0.5 %o, the price will be double, 
and so on. 
To this price should be added the amortization of prospecting and exploration 
costs, which come to $1-2 per pound of Ua08 . 
This simple outline gives the present prices of uranium (8-10%), bearing in mind 
the fact that there are no large deposits of ore possessing a content in excess of 1 or 
2%c. 
Conversely, it would be worthwhile continuing exploration while the cost of pros­
pecting for new deposits is lower than the extra cost which the exploitation of known 
low-content deposits would involve. 
Thus, in view of the prices which we have just quoted ($1-2 per pound of UeOs 
taken as an average for prospecting at the present time), there would seem to be no point 
in exploiting low-content deposits, since the cost of extraction rises very rapidly per kg 
of uranium (by $5-8 per pound of U3O8 in our table (*) in passing to 0.5 %o content 
deposits from deposits having a content of 1 %o). 
$ 6-10/t 
$3-
$3-
6/t 
4/t 
(1) If depreciation costs are ignored the figure of $4-5 is in fact obtained for the next few 
years. 
(*) With the exception of the very special case of South African uranium, which is the by-product 
of an ore already valuable by virtue of the gold content. 
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There are, however, throughout the world considerable deposits of uranium which 
because of their low content (additional complications being encountered also in the 
shape of unsolved technical difficulties connected with processing methods) cannot at 
the time of writing be regarded as a source of supply. 
In the absence of a more recent evaluation, we quote here some figures provided 
by the USAEC in May 1960 (*), considering only those deposits which are already known 
and ignoring possible resources which have not yet even been located, let alone assessed. 
QUANTITIES OF URANIUM PRESENT IN DEPOSITS NOW UNEXPLOITABLE 
(in metric tons) 
Approx. price per lb. U3Os 
North America 
Europe 
South America 
Africa 
$16 to 20 
300,000 (1) 
700,000 (2) 
70,000 (3) 
900,000 (1) 
$20 to 30 
700,000 
(1) uranium from phosphates. 
(2) mainly schists in Sweden. 
(3) uranium-bearing pyrochlore from Brazil. 
There is no need to stress that these figures are only very approximate. Further-
more, it should be recalled, for example, that uranium can at the moment only be 
extracted from phosphates in cases where the phosphates can be used in the manufacture 
of triple superphosphate; however, this industry only uses a very small percentage of 
the phosphates exploited throughout the world. The processing of the uranium-bearing 
pyrochlores in Brazil in itself poses difficult problems for which solutions have yet to 
be devised. 
This uranium "potential" should therefore be regarded with a considerable degree 
of circumspection and it is doubtless more realistic to base estimates of future prospects 
on the assumption of new discoveries rather than on the extremely hazardous exploitation 
of these poor deposits. 
Let us now revert to a discussion of the situation after 1970. 
As soon as the existing plants can no longer meet the demand, prices will rise 
again in such a way as to finance the erection of new plants at the site of deposits which 
are already known. 
Prices, in the $4-6 range during the period 1965-70, will therefore increase by 
about $2 to the $6-8 range. However, in view of the annual demand, which will rise 
gradually to 30 or 50,000 tons a year in 1980, this stage will soon be passed. 
South African uranium output is in fact linked with the production of gold and 
cannot therefore exceed 5-8,000 tons a year in view of the present prospects for the 
gold market. It may thus be assumed that out of the 97,000 tons making up South 
(*) Energy from Uranium and Coal Reserves USAEC TID 82 07. 
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African reserves in 1970, only 50-80,000 tons will be available dur ing the ten-year period 
1970-1980. 
The US plants , on the o ther hand , may still be in operat ion, bu t the remaining 
reserves will be considerably reduced. 
The pa t te rn which the si tuat ion is l ikely to follow is out l ined below, on the 
assumption tha t the u ran ium demand will rise from 10,000 tons in 1970 to 22,000 tons 
in 1975 and 38,000 tons in 1980. 
TREND FOLLOWED BY URANIUM MARKET 
(in metric tons) 
I. Annual requirements 
II. Capacity for meeting demand 
a) Pfonts in operation in 1970 
at deposits already known 
U.S.A. 
Canada 
South Africa 
Other countries 
Total 
b) Plants ivhich can be built at 
deposits already known (***) 
U.S.A. 
Canada (****) 
South Africa 
Other countries 
Total 
c) New deposits and new plants 
TOTAL 
2 
Situation 
in 1970 
10,000 
ï 
• 10,000 
10,000 
— 
— 
— 
10,000 
2 
Situation 
in 1975 
22,000 
7,000 
1,500 
2,000 
1,500 
12,000 
| 10,000 (**) 
10,000 
— 
22,000 
3 
Situation 
end 1980 
38,000 
1,500 
2,000 
1,500 
5,000 
9,500 
6,000 
15,500 
17,500 
38,000 
4 
TOTAL 
Uranium 
1970-1980 
190,000 
59,000 (*) 
| 30,000 
15,000 
104,000 
} 65,000 
65,000 
21,000 
190,000 
(*) Present known reserves will probably be exhausted shortly before 1980. 
(**) The capacity of the new plants is calculated on the assumption that 10 years' reserves are guaranteed. 
(***) Or to be completely reorganized. 
(****) If the additional 60,000 tons proved to be recoverable, they would increase the possibilities of 
production at known deposits. 
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These figures should not, of course, be taken as being strictly accurate, but the 
general orders of magnitude are such that the inevitable future pattern emerges fairly 
clearly, namely: 
— by 1970-72 prices will begin to rise as new plants are put into operation; 
— between 1975 and 1980 the deposits which are at present known will no longer 
be able to keep up with the demand and new deposits, which have yet to be discovered, 
will have to be exploited as of that date. The prices will rise again somewhat to some-
where around $7-9, in order to defray not only the plant erection costs but also the 
prospecting costs, which will in any case tend to increase in view of the fact that the 
most easily located deposits have for the most part already been discovered due to their 
geological or geographical situation. 
The latter aspect is of particular importance to the US, which will have exhausted 
all its reserves by then. This is borne out by the fact that the AEC is directing its 
attention to prospecting activities, in anticipation of a rise in prices. 
In conclusion, it would appear that: 
1. The 320,000 tons of reserves remaining on 1 January 1971 will represent a total 
of only 15 years' consumption at the most. 
2. From an analysis of the production set up, it would seem that these reserves 
will not even be sufficient to guarantee an adequate production capacity after 1975. 
3. New deposits must therefore be prospected during the next 10 years, since the 
known low-content deposits appear at all events to be much more expensive than those 
which may be discovered by new explorations on the basis of present experience. 
4. Numerous parts of the globe which have yet to be explored doubtless contain 
uranium deposits which it would be economic to mine. In view, however, of the fact that 
no spectacular discovery has been made in the world since about 1956, it would seem 
that a concentrated effort will have to be made and that at all events the development 
of nuclear energy means that immediate priority will have to be given to the perfecting 
of breeding techniques. 
V. SUPPLY PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
A detailed comparison of the conclusions reached in the preceding sections shows 
that besides the general world problems of finding new resources there will be a marked 
inbalance between the various continents. This emerges clearly from the following table. 
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REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES BY CONTINENT 
(in metric tons) 
Europe 
North America 
Other countries 
Total 
Cumulative requirements 
1970-1980 
100,000 
70,000 
20,000 
Possible production 
from known reserves 
15,000 
\ 154,000 
New discoveries 
21,000 
190,000 190,000 
Thus the European requirements , of which the Community 's share accounts for 
more than three-fifths (and would account for over 90% if Br i ta in were inc luded) , would 
have to be impor ted vir tual ly in their ent i re ty and would represent approximate ly half 
of the free-world market . 
Such a si tuat ion is commercially, and even politically, undesirable. 
Undoubtedly , the American cont inent will be an exporter , at least as far as Canada 
is concerned, bu t the above balance is still less reassuring if we a t t empt to ascertain the 
probable t rends at the end of the decade 1970-1980. 
ANNUAL REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES BY CONTINENT 
AT THE END OF THE DECADE 1970-1980 
(in metric tons) 
Europe 
North America 
Other countries 
Total 
Annual requirements 
in 1980 
20,000 
14,000 
4,000 
38,000 
Possible annual production 
from known reserves 
1,500 
11,000 
8,000 
New discoveries 
17,500 
38,000 
Even if possible product ion between 1970 from known reserves is very nearly 
sufficient to cover the cumulat ive demand over t ha t period, between 1975 and 1980 the 
ou tpu t from plants at these deposits will lag increasingly beh ind requirements . 
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To be sure, there is every reason to suppose that the new discoveries will be made 
largely in America, but even if we assume that that continent, and in particular the 
United States, can replenish its reserves at the same rate as in previous years, we find 
that American consumption will soon overhaul the domestic production capacity. 
In any case, since an effort directed at replenishment on such a scale presupposes 
substantial expenditure on exploration, the corresponding uranium will not be sold 
cheaply, and if the European countries do not foresee the situation they will be compelled 
to resort to new and probably expensive producers. 
What conclusions can be drawn from this survey, based as it is on figures which, 
it must be pointed out once more, constitute only an average estimate embodying an 
appreciable margin of uncertainty ? 
Our suggested conclusions are as follows, on the assumption, which we shall not 
discuss here, that the development of nuclear energy is continued. 
(1) Europe will probably be a very large consumer on the uranium market. This 
is not surprising in view of its industrial power on the one hand and its unfavourable 
position as regards cheap sources of supply for fossil fuels on the other hand. 
(2) Europe's present reserves are low and incommensurate with its future con-
sumption. 
(3) If it does not take control of, or participate in, the search for and exploitation 
of newly discovered uranium deposits throughout the world, Europe may well find itself 
at an economic or even political disadvantage. 
(4) In this respect Europe could take advantage of the present slump, in the 
market by acquiring interests in mines which are currently dormant (Canada) or by 
stock-piling, provided that the purchase prices do not exceed the equivalent of $7-8 in 
1975 or $4-4.5 in 1965 (at an interest rate of 6%). This might, however, present merely 
a partial solution to the long-term problema. 
(5) It should at all events undertake independent exploration for uranium 
deposits either in Europe itself or, above all, in other countries of the world which are 
considered favourable for this purpose, with the object of basing its supplies on sources 
which are as varied and reliable as possible, whilst at the same time benefiting from the 
lowest prices. A simultaneous effort should be made to improve methods of ore 
prospecting and processing in view of the space of time separating the prospecting stage 
from the commencement of production (about 10 years). 
(6) In this context the rapid development of breeder reactors is a matter of primary 
concern to Europe, in order to avoid aggravating after 1980 a situation which already 
merits attention for the preceding decade. 
It is our opinion that the earlier these problems are tackled the more easily they 
can be solved and, above all, the better will be the economic conditions for their solution. 
It is for this reason that, although we consider it necessary to study these questions 
immediately, it should not be concluded that the development of nuclear energy in 
Europe is thereby partly compromised. 
On the contrary, there are substantial advantages to be gained by pushing ahead 
with nuclear energy in Europe in view of: 
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(1) the high cost of its conventional energy; 
(2) the steadily deteriorating security of supply owing to the fact that its con-
ventional energy resources are being severely taxed by the increasing demands. 
In fact, however much it may vary, since the price of uranium in the concentrated 
stage accounts for only 3-10% of the total cost of nuclear energy, it cannot call into 
question the competitiveness of a source of energy which will become available primarily 
through scientific and technical progress. Furthermore, this low cost and the ease with 
which uranium concentrates can be stored make it possible to ensure supplies for much 
longer periods than is the case with coal or oil. 
It would, however, be regrettable—and this is our conclusion—for Europe to be 
condemned through lack of foresight to acquire all its uranium in conditions which are 
economically unfavourable and subject to political risks, which, although they could 
certainly be minimized in view of the ease of storage, would in turn finally entail a 
great deal of unnecessary expenditure. 
As for the resources of low uranium content which are at present known to exist 
on the continent of Europe, these cannot be of any help in such a case, either because in 
our opinion they will continue for a long time to be much more costly than newly dis-
covered deposits, or else because the inevitable time lag before they can be exploited 
is incompatible with the speed with which changes take place in the political sphere. 
Nor must it be held that the advent of the breeder reactor will cause a sudden 
drop in the demand for uranium. Indeed it requires numerous recycling processes and 
several decades to extract all the energy from a kilogram of uranium. Moreover, breeder 
reactors can only be brought into operation gradually, depending on the quantities of 
plutonium produced by the primary reactors. What can, however, be expected from 
the rapid development of breeder techniques is a lessening of the demand for uranium, 
which would otherwise attain enormous proportions and certainly give rise to very 
serious problems. 
There is therefore a need for a long-term European uranium supply policy which 
provides for the desired rapid development of nuclear energy, involving the earliest 
possible application of breeder techniques. 
As far as the coming 20 to 30 years are concerned, the uranium reserves are 
there, but a great deal of time will be needed to find and exploit them. Supply diffi-
culties will, therefore, arise only if insufficient forethought is devoted to the question. 
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ANNEX I 
URANIUM RESERVES IN THE FREE WORLD AT BELOW 8-104/lb. U„Oa 
(in metric tons) 
N.B. The figures below relate to reserves which, at least in part, are measured or known, and are based 
on roughly the same degree of probability in each case. 
U.S.A. 
Canada 
South Africa 
France 
Italy 
Germany 
Spain 
Portugal 
Australia 
Argentine 
Congo 
Gabon 
Japan 
India 
Miscellaneous 
RESERVES 
Ore 
millions of t. 
64 
143 
680 
19 
2 
Metal 
tons 
134,000 
145,000 
115,000 
26,000 
1,600 
800 
1,500 
5,500 
10,000 
3,800 
8,000 
5,000 
1,000 
1,200 (?) 
1,000 
Content 
% 
0.2 
0.1 
0.017 . 
0.14 
0.10 
0.2 - 0.5 
0.11 
0.12 
0.09 - 0.15 
0.1-0.2 
0.3 
0.45 
0.042 
0.06 
Reference 
date 
1962 
1962 
1962 
1962 
1962 
1962 
Dec. 1960 
1962 
1961 
1962 
Dec. 1960 
1962 
Dec. 1960 
1960 
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ANNEX II 
TREND OF ELECTRICITY AND URANIUM CONSUMPTION 
I. ELECTRICITY 
1. European Community 
The "Survey of the European Community's long-term energy prospects", recently 
published by the three Communities, contains forecasts of electricity consumption up to 
1975. 
These forecasts relate to gross consumption, but it is possible to calculate the 
net consumption and to extend the forecasts as far as 1980. 
Maximum power demand can also be estimated by using a coefficient equal to 
5,000 hours a year. 
The installed capacity required for each period has been taken as being equal 
to the maximum power demand plus approximately 12% and another 10% in 1980. 
In point of fact, the figures recorded for 1960 should have prompted us to employ 
higher coefficients, since the installed power in the Community was at that time 
70,000 MWe for a maximum load of 55,000 MWe, a coefficient of 127%. But in view 
of the dwindling proportion accounted for by hydraulic power, it can be said that the 
coefficient of utilization of installed power will improve progressively. Even apart from 
this circumstance, however, the figures adopted allow for a substantial improvement in 
the plant load coefficient, since the annual use of installed power rises from 3,900 hours 
in 1960 to over 4,500. 
Once the capacity required for use in the two reference years is determined, the 
difference will give us the capacity to be installed during the period in question, but 
this capacity must be raised by 10% for the replacement of old plant. 
We finally arrived at the following figures, which are consequently on the con-
servative side as regards capacities to be installed: 
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Net electricity consumption, including losses 
(round figures (in 109 kWh) 
Gross electricity consumption (in 10° kWh) 
Maximum power demand (in MW) 
Installed capacity (in MWe) 
Capacity to be installed (in MWe) 
1960 
270 
285 
55,000 (*) 
70,000 
— 
1970 
540 
574 
108,000 
120,000 
1980 
1,020 
1,081 
204,000 
225,000 
105,000 X 1.1=rounded up 120,000 
(*) Figure consistent with the subsequent figures on the basis of 5,000 h/year. 
In the case of the European Community, we could have dispensed with the fore-
going table, since a recent UNÍPEDE study gives very detailed forecasts up to 1975. 
Our intention, however, was to adopt a standard table for all the countries of the free 
world, utilizable on the basis of figures published , in respect of countries other than 
those in the European Community. 
The UNÍPEDE study gives a range (extrapolated up to 1980) of 90,000 to 130,000 MW 
to be installed, excluding hydraulic. Our figure of 120,000 MW, which includes hydraulic 
capacity (this, however, being relatively slight), fits into this range satisfactorily. 
What proportion of this total will be taken up by the nuclear power plants can 
be deduced from the figures given in Chapter 12 of the above-mentioned survey of 
prospects. 
According to this, installed nuclear electric capacity, which would be about 3,500 
to 4,000 MW in 1970, would rise to 10,000 -16,000 MW in 1975. A reasonable extrapolation 
from these figures brings us to 30,000 - 40,000 MW in 1980. With due caution, then, we 
can apparently adopt an average growth figure of about 30,000 MW for nuclear capacity 
installed between 1970 and 1980, corresponding to about 25% of all new construction. 
In this case too the UNÍPEDE study gives a range for 1975, namely of 12,000 to 
25,000 nuclear MWe. At all events our figure of 30,000 nuclear MW in 1980 comes within 
the previous range extrapolated to 1980 (25,000 to 60,000) and nearer to the pessimistic 
hypothesis. 
2. United Kingdom 
On the basis of the UNÍPEDE and UNO publications and a calculation scheme 
similar to the one used for the European Community, we can draw up the following 
table : 
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Electricity consumption 
Maximum power demand 
Installed capacity 
Capacity to be installed between 1970 and 1980 
(MW) 
1960 
129 
26,000 
34,500 (*) 
1970 
230 
45,000 
51,000 
1980 
(400) 
80,000 
88,000 
37,000x1.1=40,000 
(*) This figure represents an annual utilization coefficient of 3,750 h/year which is still a long way from 
the 4,500 h in our table. 
The last Whi te P a p e r on the subject predicts an installed nuclear capacity of 
5,000 MW in 1968, against a figure of 20,000 to 30,000 M W for 1975 as forecast in previous 
Whi te Papers . 
Since the United Kingdom's nuclear p rogramme is now being staggered, we may 
assume 15,000 to 20,000 nuclear M W for 1980, of which about 7,000 would be com-
missioned by 1970. Hence we may adopt a figure of about 12,000 M W for nuclear 
installations during tha t decade, representing near ly 30% of new construction. 
3 . Other European Countries 
Similar method of calculation and sources of information. 
Few nuclear programmes have as yet been clearly defined. Among them are those 
of Sweden (500 MW in 1970), Spain (1,800 M W in 1975) and Por tuga l (2,600 M W between 
1975 and 1985). 
The propor t ion we have assumed as being accounted for by nuclear energy in the 
total power supplies (10%) will probably b e far below the actual figure. 
4 . U.S.A. 
The basic figures (according to U N Í P E D E and UN) are as follows: 
Electricity consumption 
Installed capacity 
1960 
845 
185,000 (*) 
1970 
1,500 
320,000 
1975 
1,850 
400,000 
1980 
(2,250) 
490,000 
190,000 
(*) corresponds to 4,600 h/year, or the exact figure shown in our table. 
According to several recent statements, the re is l ikely to be 5,000 MW in 1970. 
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For 1980, the following forecasts have been made: 
— 40,000 nuclear MW (Electrical World May 1961) 
— 45,000 nuclear MW (General Atomics) 
— 31,000 nuclear MW (Johnson) 
— 50,000 to 80,000 (Edison Electric Institute) 
We have finally settled on an average proportion of 20% for nuclear power, i.e. 
38,000 MW to be installed between 1970 and 1980. This figure, on the basis of hypotheses 
tq; which we refer later on, is in line with a natural uranium consumption of around 
60,000 tons, which is reconcilable with the evaluation of 50,000 to 70,000 tons of U recently 
put forward by Mr. JOHNSON of the AEC (75,000 to 100,000 short tons of U 30 8 ) . 
5. Canada 
Same basis as for the US. Installed capacity in 1970 has been assumed as being 
equal to 1,000 MWe. 
6. Other Countries of the Free World 
We have assumed that 10,000 nuclear MWe will be installed between 1970 and 
1980. This figure is certainly very much on the conservative side, since Japan alone 
is expected to have as much as 7,000 to 9,000 nuclear MW by 1980. 
II. URANIUM 
1. Initial Loads 
Reduced to terms of natural uranium, necessary at the outset, the figures we have 
postulated are: 
— natural uranium-graphite: 0.8 tons per installed MWe; 
— ordinary water-enriched uranium: 0.8 tons per installed MWe. 
These identical figures are in line with the hopes raised by the most recent 
designs drawn up for each of the two strings. 
2. Consumption 
Reduced to terms of natural uranium necessary at the outset, the figures we have 
postulated are: 
— natural uranium-graphite: 40 tons per TWh (burn-up of 3,500 MW d/ t ) ; 
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— ordinary water-enriched uranium: 30 tons per TWh (it is the disposal rate for 
isotope separation plants which is the determining factor in this case). 
These figures are based on present-day techniques. There will undoubtedly be 
further improvements which will reduce specific consumption, but that would mean an 
additional fall in the cost of nuclear energy and consequently a more rapid rate of 
expansion than we have allowed for. The two phenomena, would therefore tend to 
cancel each other out to some extent. 
The use of heavy-water plants might bring about a very appreciable decrease in 
the foregoing figures, but this technique could in any case exert only a slight influence 
up to 1980. The same applies with even more force to breeder reactors, the technique 
of which is very new and, moreover, necessitates the production of plutonium before-
hand in existing reactors. 
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